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Abstract 
 
Statistics show that the sale of goods on credit is widespread among firms even when they 
are financially constrained and thus face relatively high costs in providing trade credit. A 
possible explanation for this is the use of trade credit as a competitiveness tool. By 
analyzing both the impact of customer as well as producer market power on a firm’s 
decision to provide trade credit, we examine whether trade credit is indeed used as a way 
to lock in customers by firms in developing countries. Using a new dataset containing a 
large number of firms in 42 developing countries, we find strong evidence that an 
important driving force behind the decision to provide trade credit is the urge to be 
competitive. This especially holds for those firms that still have to establish a solid market 
reputation and for firms located in countries with an underdeveloped banking sector.  
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1. Introduction 
Trade credit is created whenever a supplier offers terms that allow the buyer to delay 
payment.1 Evidence shows that trade credit is an integral part of doing business for a 
large number of firms. Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Atanasova and Wilson (2002) 
show respectively that 70 percent of small U.S. firms and 80 percent of firms in the U.K 
provide credit to their customers. Furthermore, a yearly survey of the Central Bank of 
Mexico shows that in the first half of 2004 on average about 76 percent of the Mexican 
firms provided trade credit to their suppliers. A striking feature of the data from the 
Mexican Central Bank is that small Mexican firms are more likely to provide trade credit 
than their larger counterparts. As small and medium enterprises, especially in developing 
countries, are typically more financially constrained than large firms (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt and Maksimovic (2004)), these survey results raise the question why do firms, even 
when they are financially constrained, provide trade credit to their customers? 
 Several possible motives for the provision of trade credit by firms have been 
introduced in the literature. First, trade credit might be used as a way to reduce 
transaction costs between seller and buyer (Ferris (1981). Alternatively, suppliers may 
provide trade credit because they have a long term interest in the survival of the 
customers (Cunat (2000); Wilner (2000)). Finally, suppliers may have an information, 
controlling and enforcement advantage over banks that gives them a cost advantage when 
offering credit to a buyer that is financially constrained. As a result trade credit can be 
used to redistribute funds from financially stronger firms to firms that are constrained by 
lack of finance (see for example Smith (1987), Mian and Smith (1992); Biais and Gollier 
(1997); and Cunat (2000)).2  
However, these theories do not provide a satisfactory explanation why so many 
small firms, for whom providing trade credit in general is expensive, sell their goods on 
credit. In this paper we suggest an alternative motive that can potentially explain why 
                                                 
1 The customer can also provide trade credit to its supplier through the advance payment of money, so 
called customers credit. However, we do not study this type of trade credit.  
2 For an extensive review of theoretical and empirical literature on trade credit see Mian and Smith (1992), 
Smith (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1997).  
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firms, especially small, young and financially constrained ones, sell their goods on credit: 
the use of trade credit as a tool to be competitive.  
Trade credit can be looked upon as a competitiveness tool in two ways. One, it 
allows the supplier to give easier terms of payment to a potential customer. This 
effectively lowers the price for the product especially for potential customers that are 
financially constrained. In other words, the provision of trade credit enables suppliers to 
price-discriminate (Smith (1987); Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988)). Two, as 
trade credit gives the customer time to test the good and possibly return it, it indirectly 
works as quality insurance (Smith (1987)). By offering trade credit the supplier can give 
the customer an opportunity to test the product without pay, potentially making the 
product more interesting than similar products of competing suppliers.  
If firms use trade credit as a competitiveness tool, a phenomenon that we will dub 
trade credit competition, the market structure in which the firm operates should have a 
large explanatory value in the percentage of goods the firm sells on credit. If the supplier 
is faced with a customer with large bargaining power he is more likely to provide trade 
credit as the customer can credibly threat to move to another supplier. If the supplier 
functions as a monopolist he will less likely provide trade credit, as customers have no 
option to move to another supplier. 
To examine the use of trade credit competition in developing countries we use a 
new dataset based on survey studies recently conducted by the World Bank. This dataset 
contains information on almost 18,000 firms, mostly small and medium enterprises, in 42 
developing countries dispersed over all regions. A major advantage of the survey is that 
information about customer bargaining power can be derived directly from the survey. 
Furthermore, the survey-based nature of the dataset allows us to test whether firm 
characteristics affect the use of trade credit competition by suppliers. In addition, as the 
surveys are conducted in a large number of developing countries, we can examine the 
impact of country characteristics like the development of the financial and legal system, 
on the use of trade credit as a competitiveness tool.  
We find evidence that the market power of the customer has a positive impact on 
the provision of trade credit while the market power of the supplier has a negative impact. 
This is consistent with the idea that firms use trade credit as a competitiveness tool. We 
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also find that small and young firms and firms that lack access to finance are more 
inclined to use trade credit as a tool to sell products. This suggests that reputation of the 
supplier is an important determining factor in its need to use trade credit competition. 
Thus the use of trade credit to lock in customers seems to provide an explanation for the 
provision of trade credit by firms for whom selling goods on credit is relatively 
expensive. Exploiting the cross-country variation in our data we find that customers exert 
less market power in countries where the banking sector is relatively well developed. This 
indicates that the use of trade credit to lock in customers is more prevalent in countries 
were information is limited. The development of the legal system, on the other hand, 
proves to have no effect on the use of trade credit competition.  
The paper builds on and extends earlier work done on the use of trade credit. It 
adds to the literature that tries to explain why trade credit is so prevalent amongst firms 
(see, for example, Petersen and Rajan (1997) for an overview). A number of papers in this 
area already have considered the impact of supplier market power (Petersen and Rajan 
(1995); McMillan and Woodruff (1999); and most notably Fisman and Raturi (2004)); 
however the impact of customer market power on the provision of trade credit has not 
received attention.  Furthermore, most of the research in this area has concentrated on 
industrialized countries due to unavailability of data from developing countries. Only a 
few studies have examined the determinants of supply of trade credit in developing 
countries (Fafcamps (1997) (Zimbabwe); McMillan and Woodruff (1999) (Vietnam); and 
Fisman and Raturi (2004) (five African countries)). The new dataset we use in this paper 
allows us to get a better understanding of the reasons behind the use of trade credit by 
firms in developing countries. In addition, due to the large cross-country variation the 
impact of specific country characteristics on the provision of trade credit can be studied. 
This relates our research to the literature that looks at the relationship between the use of 
trade credit and the development of a country’s financial and legal system as examined by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). Our paper complements their study as it focuses 
mainly on small and medium enterprises in contrast to publicly listed firms in their 
sample.    
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theory 
and states the hypotheses. In Section 3 the data are described. Section 4 lays out the 
empirical strategy, while the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
In the literature a number of theories have been developed that attempt to provide an 
explanation why suppliers are willing to sell their goods on credit. Ferris (1981), for 
example, argues that firms provide trade credit to lower transaction costs. By separating 
the exchange of goods from the exchange of money, trade credit substantially reduces the 
costs involved in paying and administering invoices between suppliers and buyers who 
undertake regular exchanges of goods and services. Evidence supporting the transaction 
motive has been found by Ferris (1981), Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993) and Nilsen 
(2002).  
 In addition, suppliers may provide trade credit because they have a long-term 
interest in the survival of a customer. Especially when the bulk of a supplier’s sales are to 
one firm, the supplier will have an incentive to provide finance to secure the survival of 
the customer when it faces a temporary liquidity problem. (Cunat (2000); Wilner (2000)). 
Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende (2003) find that during the Asian crisis trade credit indeed 
functioned as a transmission mechanism through which bank credit was redistributed 
from firms with a strong financial position to financially weaker ones.  
 Alternatively, suppliers can have a number of advantages over banks that can give 
them a cost advantage in offering credit to a buyer. First, suppliers can assess the 
creditworthiness of a buyer during the normal course of business, making it easier for 
them to evaluate credit risk. Second, the supplier is also more likely to be able to enforce 
repayment since he can credibly threat to cut off future supplies. Third, in case of buyer 
default, the supplier can seize the goods that are sold. Consequently, firms with a strong 
financial position can use trade credit to intermediate funds to firms that lack this access 
(Smith (1987); Mian and Smith (1992); Biais and Gollier (1997); Cunat (2000)).  
Here we provide an alternative motive for the provision of trade credit by firms, 
one that can account for the fact that trade credit is also offered by firms that are 
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financially constrained and for whom trade credit is thus relatively expensive: the use of 
trade credit as a competitiveness tool. 
Trade credit can function as a competitiveness tool in two ways. One, it allows the 
supplier to give easier terms of payment to a potential customer. This effectively lowers 
the price for the product especially for potential customers that are financially 
constrained. In other words, the provision of trade credit enables suppliers to price-
discriminate (Smith (1987); Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner (1988)). Two, as trade 
credit gives the customer time to test the good and possibly return it, it indirectly works as 
quality insurance (Smith (1987)). So by offering trade credit the supplier can give the 
customer an opportunity to test the product without pay, potentially making the product 
more interesting than similar products of competing suppliers. We dub the use of trade 
credit as a competitiveness tool trade credit competition.  
 If trade credit competition is indeed a reason for firms to provide trade credit the 
market structure in which the firm operates should have a significant impact on the 
percentage of goods sold on credit. If the supplier sells its products to a customer with 
strong market power, he is more likely to sell goods on credit as the customer can 
credibly threat to move to another supplier. In addition, a supplier who faces hardly any 
competition from other firms in the market will be less likely to provide trade credit as 
customers have no option to move to another supplier.3 Our “trade credit competition” 
hypothesis summarizes this:  
 
Hypothesis 1a:  Suppliers who sell to customers with large market power sell a larger 
percentage of their goods on credit.  
 
Hypothesis 1b:  A monopolist  provides less trade credit than a supplier in a competitive 
market.  
                                                 
3 Fisman and Raturi (2003) look at the relationship between the monopoly power of the supplier and the 
provision of trade credit and also find a negative relationship. However, their argument differs from the one 
posed in this study. They argue that since trade credit is only provided when there is trust that the loan will 
be repaid, relationship-specific investments need to be made by the customer. The customer will only do 
that in a competitive market because only then it can extract part of the surplus as it can potentially shift to 
another supplier. So monopolists will provide less trade credit as borrowers are deterred from investing in 
establishing creditworthiness.   
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Most theories explaining the provision of trade credit implicitly assume that the decision 
to provide trade credit is made at the discretion of the supplier. The decision is based on 
whether the firm has the sources to provide it and the creditworthiness of the receiving 
customer, with the customer making the decision to use the credit or not. Hypothesis 1a, 
however, introduces the possibility of role-reversion: it is not the supplier that chooses to 
provide credit to a “well-behaving” customer, it is the customer that forces the supplier to 
provide trade credit threatening to move to another supplier in case of refusal.  
In the literature a number of firm-specific characteristics have been identified that 
impact the use of trade credit. Besides the direct impact these firm characteristics have on 
trade credit, they can also potentially impact the use of trade credit indirectly through 
their effect on the use of trade credit competition by suppliers. A number of hypotheses 
can be distinguished that capture possible interaction effects between firm-specific 
characteristics and the use of trade credit as a competitiveness tool.   
The first firm-specific characteristic that can potentially affect the use of trade 
credit competition is reputation of the firm. A number of theories have been developed 
arguing that trade credit provision requires an established relationship between buyers 
and sellers (Smith (1987); Cunat (2000); and Wilner (2000)). This explains the positive 
link between age of a firm and the levels of account payables found in many empirical 
studies (Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Cunat (2000), among others). Furthermore, as 
relationship-building takes time, the need for an established relationship is one possible 
factor that explains why older firms in general provide more trade credit than younger 
firms. With respect to the “trade credit competitiveness” hypothesis this argument would 
imply that when a relationship is young, firms in a competitive industry do not provide 
more trade credit than monopolistic suppliers.  
 However, when trade credit is used as a competitiveness tool by firms selling to 
customers with strong market power, the link between the provision of trade credit and 
the length of the relationship with the customer might be reversed. One could argue that 
when customers have large bargaining power firms that lack a solid reputation are more 
likely obliged to sell the goods on credit in order to make the sale. Suggesting a negative 
correlation between reputation of the firm and the supply of trade credit to large 
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customers. The relation between reputation and the use of trade credit competition is 
summarized in the “reputation” hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms that lack a solid reputation will provide trade credit to customers 
with large bargaining power compared to firms with a good reputation. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Lack of reputation decreases the difference between the percentage of 
goods sold on credit by  a competitive supplier and a monopolist. 
 
Petersen and Rajan (1997) have pointed out that buyer reputation and credit rating can 
reduce concerns about non-payment. Their argument provides an additional explanation 
why firms dealing with customers with strong market power sell more goods on credit 
relative to firms with small customers. In other words a positive relation between 
customer market power and the provision of trade credit does not necessarily have to 
reflect the occurrence of trade credit competition.  
 The “reputation” hypothesis, however, should provide additional information as 
to whether competitiveness issues do play a role. If the reputation hypothesis holds, small 
and young firms, i.e. firms that lack a solid reputation should provide more trade credit to 
customers with large market power. As trade credit is relative expensive for these firms it 
is more likely that their credit provision, as opposed to the credit provision of large firms, 
is driven by competitiveness issues than by the fact that large customers or multinationals 
pose less credit-risk. In other words, an acceptance of the “reputation” hypothesis can be 
interpreted as evidence that a positive correlation between the provision of trade credit 
and customer market power is (at least partly) driven by competitiveness considerations.  
 If trade credit competition is perceived by all firms, regardless their standing with 
(potential) customers, as an effective tool to sell products, one would expect that firms 
with more access to external sources of finance use trade credit more extensively as a 
competitiveness tool. If this “capital-availability” hypothesis holds, firms with access to 
external sources of finance sell more goods on credit to customers with large bargaining 
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power as compared to firms that lack this access.4 Similarly, the difference in trade credit 
provided by a monopolist and a competitive supplier should, under these assumptions, be 
positively related with the financial strength of the firm. Note that the “capital 
availability” hypothesis is an alternative to the “reputation” hypothesis as firms that have 
build a solid reputation in general are also firms that have access to external sources of 
finance, i.e. the two hypotheses are opposite. The “capital availability” hypothesis can be 
summarized as follows:    
 
Hypothesis 3a: Firms with access to external sources of finance are more likely to 
provide trade credit to customers with large bargaining power. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Access to finance increases the difference between the percentage of 
goods sold on credit of a competitive supplier and a monopolist. 
 
Another possible firm-specific characteristic that can impact the use of trade credit 
competition is the type of good sold. The need for quality insurance is higher when the 
goods sold are heterogeneous as opposed to homogeneous. For example Long, Malitz and 
Ravid (1993) find that firms producing products whose quality requires longer to assess 
are more likely to extend trade credit relative to sales. This suggests that customers that 
buy highly technical products are more likely to demand quality insurance than customers 
that buy commodities, and as a result more strongly exercise their market power. 
Similarly, the difference between a monopolist and a competitive supplier in their 
provision of trade credit should decrease when the supplier produces more sophisticated 
products. We refer to this hypothesis as the “need for quality insurance” hypothesis:5   
 
                                                 
4 Note that the argument put forward here differs from, but does not contradict, the so-called redistribution 
view of trade credit. This view suggests that firms with access to external sources of finance function as 
intermediaries for firms that lack this access as suppliers have an information, controlling and enforcement 
advantage over banks (see for example Smith (1987), Mian and Smith (1992), Biais and Gollier (1997) and 
Cunat (2000)).  
5 An additional potential interesting hypothesis is whether trade credit competition is more prevalent when 
goods are internationally traded. Unfortunately, we cannot test whether this is indeed the case as all our 
competitiveness variables (discussed in the next section) are based on the market power of both supplier 
and customer in the firm’s domestic market.  
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Hypothesis 4a: Firms producing technical products are more likely to provide trade 
credit to customers with large bargaining power. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The difference between the percentage of goods sold on credit of a 
competitive supplier and a monopolist decreases when the goods sold are 
technical. 
 
Besides firm characteristics also certain country characteristics, like the development of 
the financial and legal system can potentially influence the use of trade credit as a 
competitiveness tool. As argued by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) the 
development of a country’s banking system and the use of trade credit by firms can 
theoretically either be substitutes or complements. They find evidence that the two are 
complements, which implies that it is efficient for firms to supply credit, even if they have 
to borrow to do so, as firms have advantages in evaluating loans and enforcing payment 
over pure financial intermediaries.6   
 Besides having a direct effect on the provision of trade credit, the development of 
the financial sector can also possibly have an indirect effect through its impact on the use 
of trade credit competition. When a financial system is relatively well developed more 
information is available on firm’s credit histories. This information can serve as a 
guarantee for product quality, making customers less likely to exert market power when 
the financial system is well developed. Similarly, the increase of available information 
can explain a reduction in the difference between trade credit provided by monopolists 
and competitive suppliers. Since more information is available on firms’ credit histories 
the need for a supplier to use trade credit as a tool to lock in customers diminishes. The 
impact of the development of the country’s banking system via the information channel is 
summarized in the “information” hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 5a: In a country with a well-developed banking system customers with large 
bargaining power will receive less trade credit.  
                                                 
6 Similarly Frank and Maksimovic (1998) and Biais and Gollier (1997) argue that the use of trade credit 
complements the existence of a well-functioning banking sector.  
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Hypothesis 5b: A well-developed banking sector decreases the difference between the 
percentage of goods sold on credit of a competitive supplier and a 
monopolist. 
 
In addition to more available information, the development of the banking sector implies 
that on average more credit is available for domestic firms. Under the assumption that the 
reasons for use of trade credit competition remain unchanged, the increase in capital 
available would imply a higher use of trade credit competition in these countries. 
Furthermore, in a country with a well-developed financial system the risk of holding 
account receivables is relatively small as there often exists the potential of selling them to 
a factoring company. This positive relation between the development of a country’s 
banking sector and the use of trade credit competition is posited in the “credit-
availability” hypothesis. This hypothesis is the opposite of the “information” hypothesis, 
and states that:  
 
Hypothesis 6a: Customers with large bargaining power will receive more trade credit in 
a country with a well-developed banking sector. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: A well-developed banking sector increases the difference between the 
percentage of goods sold on credit of a competitive supplier and a 
monopolist.  
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) show that the development of the legal system 
and the usage of trade credit are negatively correlated. This can be explained by the fact 
that efficiency in legal systems is more important for financial intermediaries than for 
suppliers in their risk exposure, as banks are more in need to resort to legal recourse in 
order to solve non-repayment of credit. Trade creditors are in a better position to punish 
debtors without resorting to the legal system for example because they can withhold 
further deliveries. When law and order is strong bank credit will be easier to come by 
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lessening the relative importance of trade credit, especially when bank and trade credit are 
substitutes. 
There does not seem to exist a direct reason why there would be a relationship 
between the development of the legal system and using trade credit as a competitiveness 
tool. Even though when rule of law is weak and firms have no legal recourse in the case 
of credit non-payment, the impact of this will not be very substantial. Suppliers, in 
contrast to financial intermediaries, have ways to mitigate the problems of credit 
protection for example because they can credibly enforce payment by threatening to cut 
off future supplies. This leads to the final hypothesis referred to as “constant impact legal 
system” hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 7a:  The development of the legal system will leave the impact of customer 
bargaining power on trade credit provision unaffected.  
 
Hypothesis 7b:  The difference between the trade credit provision of a competitive 
supplier and a monopolist is unaffected by the development of the 
country’s legal system. 
  
3. Data 
The data used in this paper come from the World Bank Investment Climate Unit (ICU)-
Firm Level Survey study. This project is an initiative of the World Bank to get a better 
understanding of the impact of a country’s investment climate on enterprise performance 
and international competitiveness. The main focus of the survey is on microeconomic and 
structural dimensions of a nation’s business environment, viewed in an international 
process.  
Starting in 2000 surveys have been carried out in a number of developing 
countries, and more will be conducted in the future. In general a survey is conducted once 
in each country, but occasionally the survey was conducted twice. A major focus of the 
project is to provide information that is comparable across countries, regions and/or 
income-levels (and in some cases even comparable on a sub-national regional level). With 
this objective in mind recently a core set of questions has been developed and all country 
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surveys need to include at least 85 percent of these questions. However, some of the 
surveys conducted previously contain questions that are not comparable to this Core. As 
cross-country comparison is important for our purpose we use the dataset based on the 
Core, accepting that some of the countries in the sample only provide information on a 
subsample of the questions.    
The survey comprises of quantitative indicators such as sales, supplies, ownership, 
sources of finance and employment levels, along with qualitative questions dealing with 
the opinion of the firm’s manager on the business environment and with his motivation to 
do business. Questions relating to age, legal status and ownership of the firm apply to the 
entire firm, including all establishments (factories, stores and/or service outlets), while the 
remaining questions are answered with respect to the establishment at which the survey 
was conducted.7  
 This database is unique for a number of reasons. First, it provides information for 
a large group of developing countries dispersed over all regions, making cross-country 
comparison possible. Currently data are available for 43 countries from which 42 
provided information on the use of trade credit in sales. Table 1 shows the number of 
firms in each country with information on the provision of trade credit.8 Second, the vast 
majority of the firms surveyed are small and medium enterprises and especially for these 
firms cross-country data have not been readily available. Third, and especially important 
for our purpose, this database explicitly provides information about the type of customers 
the surveyed firm is doing business with. This has the major advantage that information 
about customer bargaining power can be derived directly from the survey and thus does 
not have to be proxied for example by looking at industry concentration levels.  
 
                                                 
7 However, 74 percent of the firms in our sample has only one establishment and of the remaining 26 
percent about half consists of two establishments.  
8 In seven countries in our sample two surveys were conducted (India, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Poland, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). For each country we only use one survey as to avoid 
that firms enter the dataset twice. For India the last survey is used as this survey includes most of our 
variables of interest. For the other countries the first survey is used as the latter survey mainly focuses on 
balance-sheet data. 
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4. Empirical Strategy 
The survey provides a measure of provision of trade credit, as the respondents were asked 
what percent of the establishment’s sales were sold on credit. This gives us a dependent 
variable (soldoncred), which shows variability beyond the yes or no distinction of a 
dummy variable often used in this type of studies.    
Our dependent variable shows a concentration around zero and 100 percent so 
OLS regression is not appropriate as it fails to account for the qualitative difference 
between limit (zero and 100) observations and nonlimit (continuous) observations. 
Therefore we treat soldoncred as a censored variable, with the percentage of sales sold on 
credit only observed when it falls between zero and 100 percent and use as our regression 
model a standard tobit model with two-sided censoring.9  
The survey contains information about the market power of both the supplier and 
its customers that allows us to test whether trade credit is used as a competitiveness tool. 
Our variable measuring consumer market power, conspower, equals the percentage of 
domestic sales sold by the firm to multinationals located in the firm’s home country and 
to large domestic firms (those with approximately 300 plus workers). These are firms that 
are more likely to have large bargaining power when it comes to the suppliers they 
choose, especially when they buy inputs from small enterprises.  
The market power of the supplier is determined by using the answers to the survey 
question whether raising prices of the main product would alter the quantity demanded 
from customers. We created a dummy variable called monop, which is one if the firm 
answered that customers would continue to buy the same quantities if prices would 
increase and zero otherwise. 
To study the heterogeneous firm responses to the use of trade credit competition 
we interact a number of firm characteristics with our two competitiveness variables. In 
order to test the validity of the “reputation” hypothesis we use two well-established 
proxy variables of reputation: the size of the firm and its age. Our variable size equals the 
log of the number of permanent plus temporary employees and our variable age matches 
the log of the age of the firm.   
                                                 
9 A two-side censored tobit model is also used by McMillan and Woodruff (1999) who have a comparable 
dependent variable.   
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Another variable that can give information about the reputation of the firm is 
whether it has access to external sources of finance. Using access to finance as a proxy 
for reputation is based on the premise that firms that have no access to external sources of 
finance are firms that are not perceived as creditworthy by financial institutions and as a 
result are more likely to lack sufficient reputation with their customers.  
We construct a variable that measures the access of a firm to domestic as well as 
to foreign sources of finance, access. It is a dummy which is one if the firm has a 
relationship with a domestic bank or has access to the foreign capital markets. Firms are 
said to have access to foreign capital markets if they have a relationship with a foreign 
owned commercial bank, if any of their borrowing is in foreign currency, if a foreign 
company is the largest shareholder or owner, or if the firm has holdings or operations in 
other countries. 
The “capital availability” hypothesis is the direct opposite of the “reputation” 
hypothesis and we can test both hypotheses simultaneously. Like access to finance can 
proxy for reputation of the firm so can size and, to a lesser extent, age proxy for access to 
finance as larger (and older) firms are in a better position to find external sources of 
finance as they are perceived to be more creditworthy.   
 In order to determine whether the “need for quality insurance” hypothesis holds 
we need to construct a variable that can capture the technological content of the firm’s 
products to interact with our two competitiveness variables. We created a variable tech 
which is one if the firm indicated in the survey to have developed a new product line 
and/or a new technique that substantially changed the way the main product is produced 
in the last three years and/or received ISO certification and zero otherwise.  
To analyze the impact of country differences on the use of trade credit as a 
competitiveness tool, we interact variables capturing the development of the banking 
sector and of the legal system with our competitiveness variables conspower and monop. 
To examine the validity of the “information” and “credit availability” hypotheses, we 
use the ratio of the claims on the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP, private. 
This variable has been used in previous studies examining the impact of differences in 
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financial system development across countries (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002)).10  
 To test whether the development of the legal system indeed has no effect on the 
use of trade credit competition we use an index produced by International Country Risk 
Rating agency that captures for each country the efficiency of the state in enforcing 
property rights. This measure, legal, reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country 
are willing to accept the established institutions to make and implement laws and 
adjudicate disputes. The measure ranges from one to six, with a low value indicating that 
claims in general are settled by physical force or illegal means, while a high value implies 
that sound political instruments and a strong court system exist in the country. This 
indicator has been used in previous studies comparing institutions in different countries 
(see, for example, Knack and Keefer (1995) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(2002)).11 
 
Table 2 contains the sample statistics of the variables we consider. In addition to the 
competitiveness variables, conspower and monop, and the various interaction terms 
discussed above, we control for some potential firm-specific determinants of the provision 
of trade credit. These include both age of the firm and the number of employees. We 
allow the relationship between both age as well as size and the provision of trade credit to 
be non-linear. Additional years of the firm add significantly to a firm’s reputation early in 
life, but will have little effect later. A similar argument can be made for the size of the 
firm. Furthermore, we include access as control variable to account for the fact that firms 
with access to finance potentially pass on funds to financially more constrained firms.  
Also the export content of the firm’s sales can potentially impact the percentage of 
goods sold on credit (see for example Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)). International 
compared to domestic customers are more likely to experience delivery delays and be 
                                                 
10 In the case of China private is extremely high (1.2 on average) making China an outlier. As a result we 
have excluded China from the regressions. In addition, data on claims on the private sector by deposit 
money banks were not available for Albania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Uzbekistan. As a result, for these 
regressions the number of countries in the sample is smaller.  
11 For a number of countries in our sample no indicator for the development of the legal system is available. 
These are Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Macedonia FYR, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan. As a result, for these regressions the number of countries in the sample is smaller.  
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unfamiliar with the seller. Because of these increased risks an international buyer will 
more likely demand trade credit. A positive relationship can also be the result of 
international customers potentially being more creditworthy, which will make it less risky 
for the seller to provide trade credit. However, from the supplier’s perspective dealing 
with an international customer can also intensify information problems concerning credit 
quality and therefore the seller is more likely to demand cash payments. In other words, 
the effect of export on trade credit provision can work two ways. As to control for the 
impact of this, we created a dummy variable export, which is one if the firm exports at 
least 25 percent of its products directly (exports through a distributor are not taken into 
account).12  
To correct for the possibility that the provision of trade credit is sector driven, 
sector dummies are included: manufacturing, services, construction, agroindustry and 
other firms. To control for country-specific differences in the provision of trade credit, 
country dummies are included. When the impact of the development of the financial and 
the legal system on the use of trade credit competition is assessed, additional country 
variables are included to control for country differences not captured by the variables 
private and legal. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) we include three 
macroeconomic variables that can potentially affect the provision of trade credit. First, 
real GDP per capita (gdpcap) which controls for the economic development of the 
country. Second, the growth rate of per capita real GDP (growth) to control for potential 
business-cycle effects, and third, the rate of inflation (inflation) which may proxy for the 
willingness to enter into long-term financial contracts rather than short-term trade credit.  
 Table 3 shows the correlation matrix for the variables in our study. Our 
competition variables show the expected correlations. Customer market power is 
associated with more trade credit while monopoly power of the supplier with less trade 
credit, a preliminary indication that trade credit competition does play a role in a firm’s 
decision to provide trade credit.  
  
                                                 
12 An increase in the minimal percentage of direct exports in total sales to 50 percent would make the 
concentration of non-exporters too large (i.e. more than 90 percent).  However, we tested whether the 
estimation results were robust to other cutoffs. This was indeed the case.  
 17
5. Results 
The main focus of this paper is establishing whether competitiveness plays a role in the 
decisions of firms in developing countries to provide trade credit and, if so, whether firm 
and country characteristics influence the use of trade credit competition. Table 4 presents 
our results. To aid the economic interpretation we show, instead of parameter estimates, 
the marginal effects for the unconditional expected value of the dependent variable, 
E(y*), where y*=max(a, min(y,b)) where a is the lower limit for left censoring (0) and b 
is the upper limit for right censoring (100). To accommodate for possible 
heteroskedasticity all standard errors are robust. 
  The first column in table 4 tests the “trade credit competition” hypothesis. The 
results indicate that competitiveness is indeed a reason for firms to provide trade credit. 
The positive correlation between conspower and the percentage of goods sold on credit, 
significant at the one percent level, suggests that the willingness to provide trade credit is 
dependent on the customer’s market power. When customers have large market power, 
the supplier is more likely to provide trade credit, than when the customer is a small firm. 
The impact of customer market power on the provision of trade credit is economically 
relevant. If a firm sells 50 percent of its products to a multinational or to large companies 
instead of zero percent, the provision of trade credit will be 5.9 percent higher. This is a 
substantial increase considering that the median firm in our sample sells 30 percent of its 
goods on credit. 
Like Fisman and Raturi (2004) we find that an increase in monopoly power 
lessens the provision of trade credit. The result is significant at the one percent level and 
economically sizeable. A monopolist provides 5.1 percent less trade credit compared to 
competitive suppliers. Following the trade credit competition argument this negative 
relationship is driven by the fact that customers of competitive suppliers, in contrast to 
the ones of monopolists, have an option to move to another supplier and therefore the 
competitive seller has a stronger incentive to provide trade credit to lock in customers. 
 In the next three columns we interact the two competitiveness variables monop 
and conspower with the variables that proxy for reputation: age, size, and access. This 
allows us to test our “reputation” hypothesis versus the “capital availability” hypothesis.  
The results show that both size and age of the firm negatively affect the need to provide 
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trade credit to customers with large market power. This is consistent with the 
“reputation” hypothesis. Suppliers that mainly sell to multinationals or large corporations 
need to provide more trade credit, however, when they are large themselves or are already 
in business for several years it becomes easier to decline a potential demand for trade 
credit made by these customers without loosing their business. The magnitude of the 
interaction may be thought of in the following terms. A move from the 75th percentile of 
size to the 25th percentile will widen the gap between a supplier who sells zero percent 
and one that sells 50 percent of its goods to large customers by 4.7 percent.13  
The negative interaction between access to domestic and foreign sources of 
finance and conspower also provides evidence in favor of the “reputation” hypothesis.14 
The gap between a firm selling zero percent to large customers and a firm selling 50 
percent to large customers will be narrowed by almost three percent if the firm has access 
to external sources of finance. These results suggest that firms that lack a solid reputation 
in the market use more trade credit competition.  
The fact that especially small, young and financially constrained firms provide 
trade credit to customers with high market power is an indication that the positive 
correlation between customer market power and the provision of trade credit by firms is 
to a large extent driven by the urge to be competitive. Even though the high credit-quality 
of multinationals and large firms might partly explain why they receive more trade credit 
as suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1997), the fact that small and young firms and firms 
that lack access to external sources of finance provide more trade credit, even though the 
provision of trade credit is relative expensive for them, indicates that lower credit risk is 
unlikely to be the sole explanation, as these firms need a clear motivation as to why they 
provide trade credit. 
                                                 
13 The difference in size between the 25th and 75th percentile is 2.35, this multiplied by an increase of the 
percentage of goods sold to large firms with 50 percent and the marginal effect of the interaction term 
implies a change in the percentage of goods sold on credit of 4.7 percent.  
14 As a robustness check we created two variables capturing access to finance, one capturing access to 
domestic finance and the other access to foreign finance, as to accommodate for the possibility that firms 
with access to foreign sources of finance have a better reputation. Both domestic as well as foreign access 
to finance had a significant negative effect on the impact of customer power on trade credit. The interaction 
with monop was in both cases insignificant. We have omitted the result for brevity. They are available from 
the author upon request.  
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We find no significant evidence that lack of reputation reduces the negative 
correlation between monopoly power and the percentage of goods sold on credit. This 
result contrasts with the result found by Fisman and Raturi (2004), that the length of the 
relationship between supplier and his customer indeed increases the negative impact of 
monopoly power on the provision of trade credit. This difference might be caused by the 
fact that their measure of reputation is customer-supplier relationship specific, while our 
measure only provides a broad proxy for reputation.  
 We find substantial evidence that a company’s reputation has a significant impact 
on the market power exerted by its customers. However, also the type of goods produced, 
like the level of technically advancement, potentially affects the use of trade credit 
competition. The results of interacting our competitiveness variables with tech can be 
found in column five of table 4. Examining the interaction effects we find that the impact 
of customer market power is unaffected by whether the product made is technically 
advanced or not. Similarly, the interaction between tech and monop is also insignificant. It 
is possible that the market power exerted by the customer when the firm sells technically 
advanced goods does not lead to an increase in the percentage of the goods sold on credit, 
but is reflected in modified credit conditions, such as longer terms of credit as to allow the 
customers a longer time to test the quality of the product (Long, Malitz and Ravid 
(1993)). Unfortunately we have no information on the terms of trade credit, thus testing 
for this is not possible. 
 The impact of country characteristics on the use of trade credit competition is 
shown in the last two columns of table 4.15 In both specifications we find a negative 
relation between the provision of trade credit and the development of the legal system, 
consistent with the results found by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002). Contrary to 
their results, we also find a negative correlation between the development of the financial 
system and the provision of trade credit. This suggests that the development of the 
country’s banking system and the use of trade credit are substitutes instead of 
complements. A possible explanation for this negative relationship is that information 
                                                 
15 In all these regressions the country variables are based on the year that coincides with the year of the 
survey questions.  However, as a robustness check we estimated the same regression taking the country 
variables as the average of the year that coincides with the survey questions and the two preceding years. 
This did not affect our main results  
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about firms’ credit histories is more readily available which makes the need for trade 
credit to lock in customers less important.16 This is especially likely to affect small and 
medium enterprises. The fact that Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) look at 
publicly listed firms in both developed and developing countries and our dataset contains 
mainly small and medium enterprises might explain the contrasting results.  
The negative and significant interaction between conspower and the development 
of the financial sector suggests that customers are less likely to exert their market power 
when information about firms is more widely available, as this information can serve as a 
guarantee for product quality. Consider a move from the country at the 25th percentile of 
financial development (Russia) to a country at the 75th percentile (Hungary). This will 
narrow the gap of goods sold on credit between a firm selling zero percent to large 
customers and a firm selling 50 percent to large customers with 3.3 percent.17 The 
evidence confirms part a of the “information” hypothesis. However, we find no evidence 
that the development of the banking sector influences the difference in trade credit 
provision between monopolists and suppliers in a competitive market.  
The results in the last column of table 4 are consistent with our “constant impact 
legal system” hypothesis. The insignificance of the interaction term suggests that when 
rule of law is weak firms have ways to mitigate problems of credit protection in contrast 
to banks. As a result, the development of the legal system leaves the use of trade credit 
competition unaffected.  
 
The coefficients of the control variables in all equations are as expected. Both firm size 
and age, proxies for the reliability and reputation of a company, are large and highly 
significant, with the significance of the squared term indicating that the size of the effect 
is decreasing over size and age. Similarly, the coefficient on access is also positive and 
                                                 
16 As suggested by Fisman and Rature (2003), customers have to invest in relationship building before 
receiving trade credit. Because of the relationship-specific cost involved the customer will not easily shift 
to another supplier once the relationship is established. This provides security for the supplier that 
customers will not intentionally default on the trade credit received and thus makes it less risky for the 
supplier to provide trade credit to lock in a customer. When information about the creditworthiness of the 
customer is more readily available it is easier for the customer to switch from one supplier to another. This 
increases the risk of intentional default and as such has a negative effect on the provision of trade credit.  
17 The difference in private between the 25th and 75th percentile is 0.19, which multiplied by the marginal 
effect of –0.35 and the change in percentage of goods sold to large customers amounts to a drop in trade 
credit provided of 3.3 percent.  
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highly significant. This finding indicates that a firm with access to finance, whether 
domestically or through the international capital markets, sells more goods on credit than 
a firm without this access.18 This result is consistent with the results found by, for 
example, Petersen and Rajan (1997).   
The positive sign of export, significant at the five percent level in most 
specifications, indicates that exporters provide more trade credit to their customers. This 
positive relation can be explained by the fact that international customers are more 
creditworthy, or alternatively by the fact that the quality risk faced by international 
customers overrides the increased credit risk faced by the exporters. This result is in line 
with Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) who find that selling to international customers 
marginally increases the likelihood of the seller adopting two-part trade credit (i.e. trade 
credit where the buyer is offered a discount for prompt payment).  
Similarly the country-level control variables are consistent over all specifications. 
There exists a positive relationship between the use of trade credit and the economic 
development of the country, a negative correlation between growth and trade credit and a 
negative relationship, albeit not always significant, between inflation and the use of trade 
credit.    
 
The inclusion of both competitiveness variables conspower and monop in order to test our 
hypotheses, is preferred as it avoids the possibility that the results are driven by an 
omitted variable bias. However, this approach has a significant downside. A number of 
countries in our sample have no information about the monopoly power of the supplier. 
These countries are Bangladesh, China, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Mozambique, Pakistan, 
Peru, The Philippines, and Uganda. As a result cross-country and regional variation is 
limited in the specifications used in table 4.  
 To determine whether adding additional countries has an impact on the results and 
thus to check the robustness of our conclusions, we exclude the variable monop from the 
regressions and estimate each specification again with the extended sample. The results 
can be found in table 5.   
                                                 
18 We have also estimated all regressions using to separate variables capturing access to domestic and to 
foreign sources of finance as control variables. Both variables were highly significant in all specifications 
with the expected positive sign. The results are available upon request.  
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 Our earlier findings are robust to the exclusion of monop and the consequential 
increase in the number of countries in our sample. Again we find a positive and highly 
significant relation between the market power of the customer and the percentage of 
goods a firm sells on credit. A good reputation, as measured by the firm’s age, size and its 
access to domestic and foreign sources of finance, lessens the need to use trade credit 
competition. In addition, the impact of customer bargaining power is higher in countries 
with a less developed banking system, while the country’s legal system has no impact on 
the use of trade credit competition.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Statistics show that the use of trade credit by firms in both developed and developing 
countries is widespread, even when these firms are financially constrained and thus face 
relative high costs when providing trade credit. In this paper we argue that a possible 
explanation for this extensive use of trade credit is that it can function as a 
competitiveness tool. If the supplier’s customers have strong market power the firm is 
more likely to sell its goods on credit as the customer can credibly threat to move to 
another supplier. Furthermore, a competitive supplier can use trade credit as a way to lock 
in customers. A monopolist, on the other hand, will be less inclined to provide trade credit 
as customers have no option to move to another supplier. 
  Using data from almost 18,000 firms, mostly small and medium enterprises, in 42 
developing countries, we find strong evidence of the importance of competitiveness in the 
provision of trade credit. Our results suggest that a monopolist sells significantly less of 
its goods on credit, while customer market power proves to have a positive effect on the 
amount of trade credit a supplier provides. Furthermore, we find that on average small 
and young firms and firms that lack access to finance are more inclined to use trade credit 
as a tool to sell products. This suggests that reputation of the supplier is an important 
determining factor in a firm’s need to use trade credit competition.   
 Examining the impact of institutional development we find that the development 
of the legal system, while negatively correlated with the provision of trade credit, hardly 
affects the use of trade credit as a competitiveness tool. Contrary, a better developed 
financial system lessens the market power exercised by customers, likely because more 
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firm-specific information is available which can function as a guarantee for product 
quality.  
All in all, the results put forward in this paper suggest that trade credit 
competition is an integral part of doing business for firms in developing countries, 
especially for those firms that still have to establish a solid reputation in the market and 
firms located in countries with an underdeveloped banking sector.  
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Country No. Obs Country No. Obs Country No. Obs
Albania 129 Georgia 174 Peru 564
Armenia 169 Honduras 449 Philippines 681
Azerbaijan 167 Hungary 250 Poland 500
Bangladesh 998 India 1,788 Romania 255
Belarus 250 Kazakhstan 249 Russia 500
Bosnia & Herzegovina 175 Kenya 239 Serbia and Montenegro 393
Brazil 1,636 Kyrgyz Republic 171 Slovakia 163
Bulgaria 250 Latvia 175 Slovenia 188
Cambodia 502 Lithuania 200 Tajikistan 175
China 1,500 Macedonia, FYR 148 Tanzania 264
Croatia 187 Moldova 174 Turkey 514
Czech Republic 267 Mozambique 91 Uganda 299
Estonia 169 Nicaragua 452 Ukraine 258
Ethiopia 427 Pakistan 965 Uzbekistan 358
Table 1 - Number of Firms in Sample Countries 
This table reports for each country the number of firms that provided information on the percentage of goods sold on credit
No. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Dependent Variable
Soldoncred 17,419 39.55 30.00 38.84
Competitiveness Variables 
Monop 9,771 0.17 0.00 0.37
Conspower 12,339 22.77 0.00 32.81
Firm variables
Age 16,363 2.44 2.30 0.80
Size 16,429 3.66 3.42 1.68
Access 16,794 0.38 0.00 0.49
Tech 14,263 0.51 1.00 0.50
Export 15,518 0.16 0.00 0.37
Country variables
Private 15,287 0.24 0.26 0.11
Legal 15,816 3.38 4.00 1.10
Gdpcap 17,231 1697.75 880.06 1624.64
Growth 17,231 3.64 3.22 2.93
Inflation 17,169 9.08 4.86 12.61
Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
The summary statisics below are for the sample restricted to the firms with information on the percentage of goods sold on credit. For definition of variables and their
sources see appendix.
soldoncred conspower monop age size access tech exporter private legal gdpcap growth
conspower 0.2062***
monop -0.1058*** -0.0150
age 0.1174*** 0.079*** -0.0113
size 0.0823*** 0.2287*** -0.0124 0.2902
access 0.1258*** 0.1699*** -0.054*** 0.0457*** 0.2508***
tech 0.1402*** 0.1035*** -0.0275*** 0.0476*** 0.2169*** 0.1724***
exporter 0.0384*** 0.1510*** 0.0209** 0.0330*** 0.2970*** 0.1871*** 0.0857***
private 0.1751*** 0.1408*** -0.0354*** 0.1513*** 0.0673*** 0.0444*** 0.0309*** 0.0979***
legal -0.1840*** -0.0226** 0.0279** -0.0887*** -0.1374*** -0.2294*** -0.1759*** -0.0465*** -0.1443***
gdpcap 0.1419*** 0.0967*** -0.0615*** 0.0183** -0.0221*** 0.1508*** 0.1598*** -0.0852*** 0.3405*** -0.0131*
growth -0.2419*** -0.031*** 0.0699*** -0.1559*** 0.0453*** -0.1441*** -0.1356*** -0.0379*** -0.4259*** 0.5128*** -0.0975***
inflation -0.0484*** -0.0438*** 0.1355*** -0.0726*** -0.0542*** -0.0109 0.0266*** -0.0637*** -0.2265*** -0.1056*** 0.2018*** 0.1890***
The correlation coefficients below are for the sample restricted to the firms with information on the percentage of goods sold on credit.  ***, ** and * correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels respectively
Table 3 - Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conspower 0.117*** 0.266*** 0.222*** 0.146*** 0.118*** 0.213*** 0.134***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002]
Monop -5.057*** -4.495* -6.146* -4.443*** -6.118*** -6.385** -2.377
[0.000] [0.065] [0.059] [0.001] [0.000] [0.024] [0.613]
Conspower*Size -0.040***
[0.000]
Monop*Size -0.219
[0.747]
Conspower*Age -0.044***
[0.004]
Monop*Age 0.478
[0.727]
Conspower*Access -0.054**
[0.035]
Monop*Access -1.664
[0.451]
Conspower*Tech -0.002
[0.944]
Monop*Tech 1.825
[0.409]
Conspower*Private -0.347***
[0.010]
Monop*Private -8.112
[0.505]
Conspower*Legal -0.001
[0.920]
Monop*Legal -1.677
[0.208]
Age 7.545*** 7.259*** 7.778*** 7.397*** 7.553*** 10.894*** 11.021***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Agesq -1.951*** -1.886*** -1.822*** -1.924*** -1.941*** -2.579*** -2.612***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Size 6.847*** 6.704*** 6.586*** 6.772*** 6.661*** 8.838*** 8.817***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Sizesq -0.670*** -0.547*** -0.637*** -0.662*** -0.656*** -0.939*** -0.938***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Access 5.816*** 5.824*** 5.802*** 7.261*** 5.629*** 6.469*** 6.514***
[0.000] [0.000] 0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Export 4.737*** 4.910*** 4.800*** 4.804*** 4.777*** 0.102* 2.933*
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.087] [0.077]
Tech 1.493
[0.131]
Private -97.604*** -108.481***
[0.000] [0.000]
Legal -5.562*** -5.349***
[0.000] [0.000]
Gdpcap 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.000] [0.000]
Growth -1.817*** -1.848***
[0.000] [0.000]
Inflation -0.069** -0.066*
[0.046] [0.053]
LR chi2 4709.915 4769.776 4727.033 4727.590 4715.452 2855.070 2880.320
No. Obs. 8983 8983 8983 8983 8964 6733 6733
Table 4 - Using Trade Credit as a Competitiveness Tool
The dependent variable is the percentage of goods sold on credit. The variable conspower gives the percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals located in the home
country and to large domestic firms. Monop is a dummy for firms that do not expect to see demand drop after a price increase. Age is the log of the age of the firm . Size is the
log of the number of permanent and temporary employees. Access is a dummy for firms that have access to either domestic or foreign sources of external finance. Export is a
dummy for firms that export at least 25 percent of their sales. Tech is a dummy for firms with technically advanced products. Private is equal to bank credit extended to the
private sector divided by GDP. Legal , score 1 to 6, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes
and enforce contracts. Gdpcap is the real GDP per capita. Growth is the growth rate of the per capita real GDP. Inflation is the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator. The
regressions are estimated using two-tailed tobit, with standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity. All regressions include sector dummies and regressions (1)-(5) also include
country-dummies, however these are omitted from the table due to space considerations. All regressions include a constant. Coefficients are marginal effects. The robust p-
values appear in brackets and ***, ** and * correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Conspower 0.129*** 0.232*** 0.213*** 0.147*** 0.115*** 0.231*** 0.166***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Conspower*Size -0.026***
[0.000]
Conspower*Age -0.034***
[0.009]
Conspower*Access -0.037*
[0.091]
Conspower*Tech 0.017
[0.445]
Conspower*Private -0.357***
[0.004]
Conspower*Legal -0.006
[0.595]
Age 5.539** 5.568** 5.931*** 5.457** 5.894*** 10.036*** 10.104***
[0.013] [0.012] [0.007] [0.014] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000]
Agesq -1.528*** -1.528*** -1.442*** -1.514*** -1.602*** -2.309*** -2.325***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Size 6.499*** 6.328*** 6.302*** 6.449*** 6.415*** 9.963*** 9.986***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Sizesq -0.593*** -0.506*** -0.569*** -0.587*** -0.592*** -0.977*** -0.985***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Access 6.206*** 6.180*** 6.175*** 7.107*** 5.953*** 6.357*** 6.432***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Export 3.283*** 3.401*** 3.286*** 3.367*** 3.351*** 2.065 2.175
[0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.171] [0.151]
Tech 1.626*
[0.060]
Private -55.961*** -64.300***
[0.000] [0.000]
Legal -7.101*** -6.980***
[0.000] [0.000]
Gdpcap 0.006*** 0.006***
[0.000] [0.000]
Growth -1.513*** -1.521***
[0.000] [0.000]
Inflation -0.079** -0.075**
[0.016] [0.021]
LR chi2 4709.915 4769.776 4727.033 4727.590 4715.452 2855.070 2880.320
No. Obs. 8983 8983 8983 8983 8964 6733 6733
Table 5 - Using Trade Credit as a Competitiveness Tool, Robustness Test 
The dependent variable is the percentage of goods sold on credit. The variable conspower gives the percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals located in the
home country and to large domestic firms. Age is the log of the age of the firm. Size is the log of the number of permanent and temporary employees. Access is a dummy
for firms that have access to either domestic or foreign sources of external finance. Export is a dummy for firms that export at least 25 percent of their sales. Tech is a
dummy for firms with technically advanced products. Private is equal to bank credit extended to the private sector divided by GDP. Legal , score 1 to 6, is an indicator
of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts. Gdpcap is the real GDP per capita.
Growth is the growth rate of the per capita real GDP. Inflation is the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator. The regressions are estimated using two-tailed tobit, with
standard errors robust for heteroskedasticity. All regressions include sector dummies and regressions (1) to (5) also include country-dummies, however these are omitted
from the table due to space considerations. All regressions include a constant. Coefficients are marginal effects. The robust p-values appear in brackets and ***, ** and
* correspond to 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance respectively.
Variable Definition Source
Soldoncred ICU Investment Climate Survey
Conspower ICU Investment Climate Survey
Monop ICU Investment Climate Survey
Age ICU Investment Climate Survey
Size ICU Investment Climate Survey
Access ICU Investment Climate Survey
Tech ICU Investment Climate Survey
Export ICU Investment Climate Survey
Private International Financial Statistics
Legal International Country Risk Guide
Gdpcap World Development Indicators
Growth World Development Indicators
Inflation World Development Indicators
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm has a
relationship with a domestic and/or a foreign owned commercial
bank, if a share of the firm's borrowing is in foreign currency, if a
foreign company is the largest shareholder or owner, or if the firm has
holdings or operations in other countries, zero otherwise. 
Appendix - Variable Definitions and Sources
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm does not
expect to see demand drop after a price increase, zero otherwise. 
Percentage of domestic sales sold to multinationals in the firm's home
country and to large domestic firms (those with approximately 300
plus workers). 
Growth rate of real per capita GDP, based on the year that coincides 
with the year of the survey questions.
Inflation rate of the GDP deflator, based on the year that coincides 
with the year of the survey questions.
Real per capita GDP, based on the year that coincides with the year of 
the survey questions.
Percentage of goods sold on credit.
Measure of law and order tradition in the country, scored 1 to 6. Low
scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force and illegal
means to settle claims. High scores indicate sound political
institutions and a strong court system, based on the year that
coincides with the year of the survey questions.
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm developed a
new product line and/or developed a new technique that substantially
changed the way the main product is produced in the last three years
and/or received ISO certification, zero otherwise. 
Dummy variable that takes on the value one if the firm exports at
least 25 percent of its products directly (exports through a distributor
are not taken into account), zero otherwise. 
Credit extended by deposit money banks to the private sector divided
by GDP, based on the year that coincides with the year of the survey
questions.
Log of the age of the firm
Log of the number of permanent plus temporary employees.
